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Abstract
Decisions taken in a national forum affect the interests of individuals who, 
as non-citizens, are excluded from the decision-making-process. In the 
contemporary world, individuals and social groups can be severely harmed as 
a result of decisions taken far away from the place where they live and often 
even without any direct intervention. The issue of the consideration of non-
national interests within national decision-making-processes is thus becoming 
increasingly important. The contribution begins with a brief analysis of the 
concept of solidarity, as the legal obligation to take into account non-national 
interests has been labelled in the international law scholarship. In contemporary 
international law, solidarity is a principle to be interpreted and further developed, 
rather than a right articulated in firm rules. Yet, from the epistemological point 
of view the legal system is always based on extra-legal concepts and reasoning. 
Thus, the reference in legal principles to non-legal arguments should not be 
regarded as a disadvantage but as a precious contribution to the inescapable 
link between legal and extra-legal discourses. On the basis of this assumption, 
the article concentrates on the main extra-legal reasons that have been brought 
into the debate in order either to deny both the existence of a duty of solidarity 
within the lex lata as well as the necessity to introduce it de lege ferenda; or, 
on the contrary, to maintain the paramount importance of such a duty. The 
analysis will end with some considerations on how the political and juridical 
forum could be concretely opened up, through proper legal and institutional 
arrangements, to a deliberation that gives access to the arguments of the others.
A. Introduction
In several ways, decisions taken within the national scope affect both 
people who, as non-citizens, are excluded from the decision-making-process and 
their justified interests. These individuals, as well as social and national groups, 
are required to live with the consequences of choices made by other social groups 
without any chance of influencing the outcome of the pronouncement and, 
therefore, also their own destiny.1 This fact, however, goes against our deepest 
1   “The human rights of individuals, groups and peoples are affected by and dependent on 
the extraterritorial acts and omissions of states. The advent of economic globalization, in 
particular, has meant that states and other global actors exert considerable influence on the 
realization of economic, social and cultural rights across the world.” See: O. De Schutter 
et al., ‘Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States 
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sense of justice as well as our commitment to a participatory and democratic 
understanding of human interactions. Nevertheless, precisely this attitude has 
characterized much of human history, and the focusing of attention within the 
decision-making-process exclusively on the self-centred interests of the national 
community is a correct description of what is still happening today – at least in the 
most cases and in spite of normative attempts heading to the opposite direction. 
Yet, this has not been the only view of things in the past two thousands years. 
The obligation – or, better, the moral duty – to take a universal and not merely 
an egoistic point of view in framing political decisions has been proclaimed by 
many thinkers and philosophers since Stoicism first introduced to the Western 
world the idea that the whole of human society can be seen as ruled by only 
one nomos and all human beings build a “cosmopolis”.2 Yet, when it comes to 
the implementation of this obligation within the political and juridical praxis, 
historical examples are few and generally far from adequate: universalism was 
understood as based more on respect for the general principles of divine and 
rational law than on a forum in which a discursive recognition of the reasons of 
the others can be achieved.3
In the contemporary, ever more interconnected world we are confronted 
with the possibility of doing harm, as a consequence of national decisions, not 
only to neighbours but also to peoples living far away from the place where the 
decisions are taken.4 Unlike the damage inflicted during the era of colonialism, 
in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, 34 Human Rights Quarterly (2012) 
4, 1084-1085 (Preamble, para. 1).
2   On Stoicism as the first attempt to conceive order as universal see: M. C. Nussbaum, 
‘Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism’, 5 The Journal of Political Philosophy (1997) 1, 1, 12; 
A.  von Bogdandy & S. Dellavalle, ‘The Paradigms of Universalism and Particularism 
in the Age of Globalisation: Western Perspectives on the Premises and Finality of 
International Law’, in The Xiamen Academy of International Law, Collected Courses of the 
Xiamen Academy of International Law, Vol. 2 (2009), 45, 53; S. Dellavalle, Dalla comunità 
particolare all’ordine universal - I paradigmi storici dell’ordine, Vol. I (2011).
3   A first – surely partial and ultimately self-interested – example of the consideration of non-
national claims was the old Roman ius fetiale. On its praxis as well as on the limits of this 
approach see: A. Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (1950), 16. To some 
extent, the duty of Christian States to respect divine and rational law – and therefore 
also the justified interests of other Christian or even non-Christian peoples – under the 
supreme moral authority of the Roman Church can also be seen as such an early example. 
For a presentation of this theory, albeit without direct references to the recognition of 
non-national interests, see: F. Suárez, ‘Defensio fidei catholicae et apostolicae adversus 
anglicanae sectae errores’, in F. Suárez, Selections from three Works, Vol. III (1944), 667.
4   See, as an important reflection on one of the most discussed examples of transboundary 
negative effects of national decisions: R. M. Bratspies & R. A. Miller (eds), Transboundary 
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contemporary harms to non-citizens can even be indirect, for example through 
pollution or financial as well as economic policies, hitting foreign populations in 
a subtler way, but on a significantly wider scale. On the other hand, our world is 
characterized by media coverage which includes a large part of the global society 
and is capable of mobilising what has been called the colère publique mondiale.5 
The globalization of the possibility of doing harm corresponds, therefore, to the 
globalization of sensitization to the worldwide violations of human rights. As 
a consequence, the issue of the consideration of non-national interests within 
the political decision-making-process and the jurisprudential praxis is urgently 
coming to the fore and has an unprecedented chance of achieving concrete 
results.
The legal obligation to take non-national interests into account has in 
the international law scholarship been labelled solidarity. Thus, I will begin my 
analysis with a brief presentation of how this concept has been elaborated within 
the lex lata (B.). Although strong arguments sustain the view that solidarity has 
already been established in positive law, the fact that the provisions on solidarity 
have mainly taken the form of legal principles has raised some concerns about 
their consistency as legal norms. In other words, it may be countered that the 
concretisation of the concept of solidarity in legal terms seems rather to have 
been built – at least hitherto – either on interpretations resorting to extra-legal 
considerations6 or on arguments de lege ferenda. The claim that legal norms 
are valid only if they are self-subsistent and, therefore, unrelated to any extra-
legal discourse is grounded on the assumption that the legal system has to be 
– and can be – logically and epistemologically self-sufficient. In contrast, a short 
presentation of the inherent contradictions and conceptual difficulties in which 
even the most ambitious attempts to demonstrate the self-sufficiency of the legal 
system are trapped justifies the claim that the legal discourse has necessarily to 
Harm in International Law: Lessons from the Trail Smelter Arbitration (2006).
5   A. Fischer-Lescano, ‘Globalverfassung: Verfassung der Weltgesellschaft’, 88 Archiv für 
Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (2002) 3, 349, 359, who derives the concept from Émile 
Durkheim. 
6   I understand legal discourse, in this context, as the discourse concerning directly legal 
norms and their application. By contrast, extra-legal discourse is, in principle, any kind of 
discourse that concerns fields other than the above-mentioned. Linking the former with the 
latter means, concretely, that interpretations or developments regarding any component of 
the legal system (rules, principles, etc.) always imply a reference to arguments elaborated 
in contexts other than the law, mainly in social (non-legal) and political interactions as 
well as in scientific discourses reflecting on them (such as sociology, political science, as 
well as moral, social and political philosophy).
221Opening the Forum to the Others
be extended to – and integrated by – extra-legal concepts and reasoning (C.). 
Admitting, therefore, that a cautious extension of the legal discourse to extra-
legal arguments is, from an epistemological point of view, not only acceptable 
but even inescapable, I will move on to describe the main extra-legal reasons 
that have been brought into the debate in order either to deny the interpretation 
of the existing law in the sense of a duty to solidarity as well as the need for a 
further development of the law in this direction (D.), or, on the contrary, to 
support the opening up of the national forum to the others (E.). The analysis 
will end with some tentative remarks on how the political and juridical forum 
could be concretely made accessible, by means of proper legal and institutional 
arrangements, to a deliberation that includes the arguments of the others, i.e. to 
non-national interests (F.).
B. Is There a Legal Obligation Concerning Solidarity?7
Taking non-national interests into consideration requires comprehension 
of two dimensions (infra, F.): the one concerning the legal and institutional 
response at the national level; the other consisting of international law provisions. 
While the first dimension, in general, is on the whole yet to be built, the second 
one – which may also have significant influence on national policies and on 
adjudication practice – has already been implemented, at least partially, through 
the provisions of international law regarding solidarity.8
According to the definition proposed by Rüdiger Wolfrum, solidarity in 
international law rests on the consideration that “States acting merely on an 
individual basis cannot provide satisfactorily for solutions which the interests of 
the community demand. Such demands require a common action.”9 Solidarity 
thus means “[...] that States in shaping their positions in international relations 
should not only take into consideration their own individual interests but also 
those of other States or the interests of the community of States or both.”10 
7   I am grateful to Matthias Goldmann and Holger Hestermeyer for helpful conceptual and 
bibliographical suggestions on the topic of this section.
8   For a general overview on the concept of solidarity in international law, see: D. Campanelli, 
‘Principle of Solidarity’, in R. Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public 
International Law, Vol. IX (2012), 288.
9   R. Wolfrum, ‘Solidarity amongst States: An Emerging Structural Principle of 
International Law’, in P.-M. Dupuy et al. (eds), Völkerrecht als Wertordnung – Common 
Values in International Law: Festschrift für Christian Tomuschat (2006), 1087 [Wolfrum, 
Solidarity amongst States].
10   Ibid., 1087-1088.
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Concretely, the implementation of solidarity implies a twofold task: on the one 
hand the requirement to cooperate in order to achieve shared interests,11 on the 
other the amelioration of “[...] existing deficiencies or disparities [...]”.12
References to solidarity have been introduced into positive international 
law in several different legal regimes.
a) In the international system on the protection of peace, solidarity is implied, 
first, in the “[...] inherent right of ... collective self-defence [...]”, according to 
“[...] the underlying rationale of Art. 51 UN Charter [...]”,13 and, second, in 
the system of collective security (Chapter VII UN Charter) insofar as “[...] it 
obliges States to act in the interest and defence of a common value, namely the 
preservation of peace.”14
b) As regards international environmental law, Wolfrum refers in 
particular to the principles of sustainable development and of common but 
differentiated responsibility, as established in the Rio Declaration of 1992 as well 
as in documents and agreements such as the Convention on Biological Diversity 
and the Framework Convention on Climate Change.15
c) Considering the world trade law regime, “[...][the] objectives referred to 
in the Preamble of the WTO Agreement define a common value, namely the 
enhancement of the economic development.”16 Moreover, we have here also the 
second aspect of solidarity, namely the commitment to “[...] the amelioration of 
existing deficiencies, and the need to further promote the economic development 
11   The need to implement solidarity can be thus a strong justification for cooperation. 
Nevertheless, solidarity has to be generally distinguished from cooperation since the former 
is an attitude – or rather a duty – based on a legal principle, the accomplishment of which 
does not imply necessarily the existence of mutual advantages. In this sense, solidarity 
may impose unilateral obligation on just one actor of the interaction. At the same time, 
it is universalistic in its essence insofar as the obligations are thought to be valid towards 
every human being who may be affected by the actor’s decisions. By contrast, cooperation 
always presupposes – even if it is inspired by an initial attitude of solidarity – mutual 
obligations concerning the parties to the treaty. Furthermore, it is particularistic because 
the obligations are imposed only on the signing parties. On the concept of cooperation in 
international law, see: R. Wolfrum, ‘International Law of Cooperation’, in R. Wolfrum 
(ed), The Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Vol. II, (2012), 783.
12   Wolfrum, ‘Solidarity amongst States’, supra note 9, 1088.
13   Ibid., 1090.
14   Ibid., 1093.
15   Ibid., 1093-1094.
16  Ibid., 1097.
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of developing countries.”17 The liberalization of trade must be seen, therefore, in 
the light of those higher normative priorities.18
d) Lastly, in the field of humanitarian assistance and intervention solidarity 
has been implicitly invoked in the Resolution on Humanitarian Assistance to 
Victims of Natural Disasters, adopted by the General Assembly on 8 December 
1988.19 Furthermore, the institutional powers of the Security Council under 
Chapter VII UN Charter, with the competence to take action to protect the 
peace or even to legitimize humanitarian interventions, are based upon the 
principle of solidarity.20 It is particularly significant that solidarity is exercised, 
in the case of humanitarian intervention, not among states but by states towards 
a population of another state.21
e) Although within the four above-mentioned law regimes the taking into 
consideration of non-national interests is related, in a broad sense, to the issue of 
human rights protection, the question arises whether the reference to solidarity 
has made its entry into that specific law regime which is explicitly dedicated, 
at the global-international as well at the continental level, to the safeguarding 
of human rights.22 As a consequence, solidarity would be unambiguously 
qualified, in this case, as a right the fulfilment of which every human being (or, 
according to a more communitarian understanding, every social and political 
group) can demand from any other individual or group. Starting with the 
global-international level, the essential relationship between human rights and 
solidarity – whereby solidarity in itself is deemed to be a right, so that a specific 
right to solidarity should be introduced or regarded as already existing – has been 
proclaimed in particular by documents issued by the Human Rights Council 
(HRC) either directly (i.e. in form of a resolution of the HRC),23 or through 
the special rapporteur appointed by the HRC to study this particular issue.24 
17   Ibid., 1097.
18   Ibid.
19   Ibid., 1098.
20   Ibid., 1099.
21   Ibid. (emphasis added). For the justification of this shift in the reasoning from solidarity 
between States to solidarity with foreign citizens in their cosmopolitan quality 
see: infra, E. IV., F.
22   I am grateful to Christopher McCrudden for this suggestion.
23   Human Rights and International Solidarity, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/15/13, 30 September 
2010.
24   Note by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Promotion and 
Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Including the Right to Development. Human Rights and International Solidarity, UN Doc 
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The references made in these cases to existing international law norms address25 
provisions contained in the Charter of the United Nations,26 in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights,27 and in the Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.28 Despite some normative evidences, the positions taken by 
the HRC have been highly controversial, having met with strong resistance 
especially from Western countries.29 Among the reasons behind the Western 
states’ opposition to the introduction of an explicit right to solidarity along the 
lines laid down by the HRC and its special rapporteur might have been a narrow-
minded fear of being made responsible for injustice and harms inflicted upon 
non-Western countries by colonialistic and imperialistic policies, as well as a 
general scepticism – conceptually highly contestable, but well-rooted especially 
in the legal tradition of the Anglophone countries – against the establishment 
of positive rights, i.e. of rights that, for their implementation, require pro-active 
intervention by the public powers. Furthermore, the Western world’s opposition 
may also have been motivated by understandable concerns as regards the 
wording of the resolution and, in general, of the documents of the HRC, in 
which, although there are references not only to the “right of peoples” but also 
to the “right of individuals” to international solidarity,30 the prevailing attitude 
appears to be in favour of an understanding of solidarity as a “third generation 
right”,31 namely a right that can be implemented only collectively. It is precisely 
this collective dimension that characterizes certain entitlements insofar as they 
A/HRC/9/10, 15 August 2008; Report of the Independent Expert on Human Rights and 
International Solidarity, UN Doc A/HRC/15/32, 5 July 2010.
25   See, in particular UN Doc A/HRC/9/10, supra note 24, paras 8 & 9.
26   Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Art. 1, para. 3; Chapter IX, Arts 55 & 56, 1 
UNTS XVI.
27   Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 A (III), UN Doc A/RES/810 at 71, 
10 December 1948, Art. 28.
28   International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 
Art. 2; Art. 11, para. 2, 993 UNTS 3.
29   The resolution of the HRC on Human Rights and International Solidarity, supra note 23, 
has been adopted by a recorded vote of 32 to 14. Among the states that voted against the 
resolution were all members of the European Union which were part of the HRC, along 
with the United States of America, Japan, South Korea, Norway, Switzerland, Moldova 
and Ukraine.
30   UN Doc A/HRC/RES/15/13, supra note 23, Arts 10, 12 and 14; UN Doc A/HRC/9/10, 
supra note 24, paras 2, 5, 17, 25-26; UN Doc A/HRC/15/32, supra note 24, paras I. 3, II. 
C. 37, III. A. 40, IV. 60.
31   UN Doc A/HRC/RES/15/13, supra note 23, Art. 9; UN Doc A/HRC/9/10, supra note 
24, para. 1, Annex: 3, 5, 7; UN Doc A/HRC/15/32, supra note 24, paras II. A. 11, Annex: 
3, 4, 7.
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are thought to belong to the third generation of rights and, however, clearly 
comes up against the individualistic rights conception which is predominant 
within the Western tradition.
If solidarity can hardly be seen as a recognized right at the global-
international level, the situation is not essentially different as regards the 
continental, in this case European, level.32 Indeed, Art. 1 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR) states that “[the] High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this 
Convention.”33 With reference to the protection of non-citizens from harms34 and 
the taking into consideration of their justified claims, the question is therefore 
how far this jurisdiction can reach. Yet, the interpretation by the European 
Commission of Human Rights (ECommHR) and the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECourtHR) has been quite restrictive in its substance, insofar 
as they eventually opt, regardless of the cautious introduction of some elements 
of a “relational” approach to the question,35 for a conception of jurisdiction as 
being identical to territorial control. This preference was expressed in particular 
by the Grand Chamber of the ECourtHR in its decision of principle concerning 
the Banković Case.36 However, while a “relational” interpretation of jurisdiction 
could cover all cases of transboundary harm inflicted on individuals by state 
powers or by private actors subjected to state power even if the state involved 
did not exercise effective control on the territory in which the individuals 
concerned lived, the identification of jurisdiction with territorial control limits 
the application of the provision to only a few cases, excluding many situations 
32   N. Vennemann, ‘Application of International Human Rights Conventions to 
Transboundary State Acts’, in Bratspies & Miller (eds), supra note 4, 295.
33   European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
4 November 1950, Art. 1, 213 UNTS 221 [ECHR].
34   The protection of non-citizens from harms, guaranteed – at least according to a 
progressive interpretation strategy, as we see below – by Art. 1 of the ECHR, defines the 
rather negative side of solidarity, i.e. of the general aim of taking into account the justified 
request by non-citizens not to suffer significant impairments as the result of decisions 
taken within national fora. The positive side, on the other hand, which also includes 
pro-active actions by state powers in order to overcome conditions of past and present 
injustice, characterizes the introduction of the solidarity principle into international law 
provisions – as described under a) (limited, here, to the system of collective security), 
b), c) and d), as well as the approach of the HRC considered under e).
35   Vennemann, supra note 32, 297.
36   Banković and others v. Belgium and others, ECtHR Application No. 52207/99, Decision of 
12 December 2001.
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that may result from “the increasingly transboundary or extraterritorial range 
of state action”.37 Surely, Art. 1 of the ECHR does not, in principle, exclude a 
broader understanding of jurisdiction. Moreover, since “[the] reluctance to apply 
the international law of human rights to extraterritorial state acts is no longer 
tolerable”,38 a dynamic interpretation of the legal instrument provided by Art. 
1 ECHR would be much needed. Nevertheless, such an interpretation has, for 
the time being, to be seen as part of a discourse de lege ferenda, the concrete 
implementation of which is far from being certain.39
Considering the lights and shadows of the normative situation,40 two main 
criticisms have been formulated against the thesis that solidarity has already 
become part of positive international law: the first claims that provisions on 
solidarity are abstract and generic, and so an exercise of goodwill or a project 
de lege ferenda, rather than effective law;41 the second points to the partial and, 
in general, inadequate implementation of the provisions.42 As regards the first 
criticism, in spite of the perception by some actors in international relations43 
and of the efforts undertaken by the HRC, the idea of introducing solidarity as 
an individual or collective right or interpreting international law provisions in 
37   Vennemann, supra note 32, 307.
38   Ibid.
39   On the emerging principle of international law asserting, to the contrary, the disjunction 
of “acts and omissions” of States “that have effects on the enjoyment of human rights” 
from the condition of territorial jurisdiction, see: De Schutter et al., supra note 1, 1101 
(Art. 8 a).
40   A further field could be taken into account as regards the introduction of solidarity as a 
legal principle, namely the law of the European Union. Indeed, solidarity is here more 
strongly asserted than within international law regimes, although it remains weaker than 
in national legal systems. Yet, the clearer affirmation of solidarity is due, in EU law, 
precisely to the fact that this legal system contains federalist elements which distinguish 
it from international law regimes in the proper sense of the word. See A. von Bogdandy, 
‘Constitutional Principles’, in A. von Bogdandy & J. Bast (eds), Principles of European 
Constitutional Law, 2nd ed. (2010), 3, 11-12 [Bogdandy, Constitutional Principles]. As 
a result of the introduction of EU citizenship as well as of other provisions of EU law 
concerning the free movement of workers, solidarity has to be regarded in the Union as a 
duty towards fellow citizens and not towards foreigners. As a matter of fact, however, EU 
solidarity is proving – despite the federalist contents – to be more fragile than expected.
41   Y. Dinšte. in, ‘Discussion Following the Presentation by Philipp Dann’, in R. Wolfrum & 
C. Kojima (eds), Solidarity: A Structural Principle of International Law (2010), 79.
42   H. P. Hestermeyer, ‘Reality or Aspiration? – Solidarity in International Environmental 
and World Trade Law’, in D. König et al. (eds), Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity: 
Liber Amicorum Rüdiger Wolfrum, Vol. I (2011), 45.
43   UN Doc A/HRC/15/32, supra note 24, 3.
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the sense of a pre-existing right to solidarity has met and still constantly meets 
– as briefly depicted supra, under e) – relevant challenges and resistance. Indeed, 
as a consequence of these difficulties, solidarity has not generally been seen as a 
right expressed by exactly defined rules, but rather as a “principle”44 – and as such 
it has also been understood within the legal regimes described above (a – d). In 
doctrine, in particular, solidarity has been interpreted as a “structural principle 
of international law”,45 or as a “[...] fundamental and fundamentally sound 
principle of international law [...]”,46 or even as a “constitutional principle”.47 
Therefore, the standing of solidarity as a matter of international law is, at least 
for the time being, strictly dependent on the status of principles within the legal 
system.
In this regard, it has been argued48 that the concept of principle can be 
used, in legal discourse, in three ways. First, principles can be firmly anchored 
legal norms – like the “legal principles” of national constitutional law and of 
EU law49. Second, principles can have a predominantly philosophical meaning. 
Finally, principle may be used in a purely colloquial sense. In both the second 
and third usages, principles would, from the perspective of a formalistic legal 
approach, be a rather shaky basis for the legal discourse. These are, however, 
precisely the ways in which the reference to solidarity as a principle emerges in 
contemporary international law. Yet, this interpretation ignores the specific – 
and very special – role played by principles in legal systems. Indeed, principles 
are purposely distinct from rules;50 in particular, they are explicitly thought to 
be weighted and to build, as “[...] optimization commands [...]”,51 the conceptual 
44   Ibid.
45   Wolfrum, ‘Solidarity amongst States’, supra note 9; R. Wolfrum, ‘Solidarity amongst 
States: An Emerging Structural Principle of International Law’, 49 Indian Journal of 
International Law (2009) 1, 8.
46   R. S. J. Macdonald, ‘Solidarity in the Practice and Discourse of Public International 
Law’, 8 Pace International Law Review (1996) 2, 259.
47   K. Wellens, ‘Solidarity as a Constitutional Principle: Its Expanding Role and Inherent 
Limitations’, in R. S. John Macdonald & D. M. Johnston (eds), Towards World 
Constitutionalism. Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community (2005), 775; 
K. Wellens, ‘Revisiting Solidarity as a (Re-)Emerging Constitutional Principle: Some 
Further Reflections’, in Wolfrum & Kojima (eds), supra note 41, 3.
48   Hestermeyer, supra note 42, 46.
49   On “founding principles” within EU primary law see Bogdandy, ‘Constitutional 
Principles’, supra note 40, 12.
50   R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977).
51   R. Alexy, ‘On the Structure of Legal Principles’, 13 Ratio Juris (2000) 3, 294; R. Alexy, 
Theorie der Grundrechte, 2nd ed. (1994), 75-76. 
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context in which rules are also embedded. In the dimension of legal principles – 
and, more specifically, in all meanings in which the concept of principle can be 
used – legal discourse meets moral, ethical, philosophical and, in general, extra-
legal arguments,52 making interpretation of the law possible as well as paving the 
way for its further development.53 
“I love to sail forbidden seas, and land on barbarous coasts” – asserts 
Ishmael in Herman Melville’s Moby Dick.54 The craft from within the legal 
system that helps us to reach unexplored coasts of jurisprudence is what we 
call principles. Solidarity’s status as a principle, therefore, is not a discredit. 
Instead, the skilful and courageous interpretation of principles based on ethical 
arguments or even on colloquial practices should be seen as an extremely 
useful and rational characteristic, belonging in general to all legal principles 
by reason of their position within the legal system. From this perspective the 
second supposed shortcoming of the solidarity principle – namely its alleged 
ineffectiveness – can also be viewed in a more positive light: law is not a static 
system; thus, in order to adapt to new situations and improve, it needs concepts 
and norms which accept the challenge of discovering a broader horizon and 
exploring unknown territories.55
C. On the Relationship Between Legal and Extra-legal   
 Discourses
My positive evaluation of the role of solidarity as a legal principle within 
the international law system – against the many critiques that have been raised 
against it – is lastly grounded on the epistemological premise that legal and 
extra-legal discourses are not impermeable but, instead, are open to each 
other in a kind of osmosis. Legal propositions are always connected to extra-
legal concepts and assumptions, and on this connection is based the ability to 
52   J. Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung: Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des 
demokratischen Rechtsstaats (1992), 552 [Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung].
53   For a different understanding of principles, according to which their essential relationship 
with extra-legal discourses is not stressed, but rather their structural function within the 
legal system, see: A. von Bogdandy, ‘General Principles of International Public Authority: 
Sketching a Research Field’, 9 German Law Journal (2008) 11, 1909.
54   H. Melville, Moby Dick (2008), 5.
55   This consideration should not, however, lead us to the conclusion that legal norms on 
solidarity do not necessitate further clarification and better realization, but just to the 
conviction that this task can be accomplished only by opening the legal discourse to 
suggestions from outside.
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interpret and further develop the law. I will support my assertion ex negativo by 
briefly analysing the claim to self-sufficiency of the legal system advanced by 
some strands of legal theory.
At the end of the 16th century, as political scientists and legal theorists 
fought to emancipate the law from the primacy of metaphysics and theology, 
Alberico Gentili – one of the most prominent and committed among those 
intellectuals – formulated the famous motto: “Silete, theologi, in munere 
alieno!”56 The task of silencing theologians on non-religious questions, i.e. the 
task of building a legal system which had to be independent of the law of God 
and of its interpreters as well as of moral or ethical truth in general, would 
still take many centuries to achieve. The project of finding a legal science not 
based on extra-legal assumptions was not properly accomplishment until the 
20th  century, as two significant theoretical attempts were started with the 
explicit aim of decoupling the legal system from extra-legal discourses, the first 
– Hans Kelsen’s Reine Rechtslehre57 (a) – collocated in legal theory, the second – 
Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory of the law58 (b) – in legal sociology.
a) In order to address whether the project of a self-sufficient legal doctrine 
is feasible and whether it is really capable of producing better results than a legal 
doctrine linked with extra-legal discourses, it may be useful to focus first on the 
criticism that Kelsen formulated against Kant – in his eyes the most important 
and ambitious exponent of the old school. Kelsen asserts that Kant actually based 
his concept of the positive law on the metaphysical foundation of natural law. 
For that reason, Kant as a political and legal philosopher would betray his own 
methodological premises as a theoretical philosopher: while Kant’s theory of 
knowledge overcomes metaphysics, his legal and political thought would yet 
presuppose an objective truth, therefore conflicting with that ethical plurality 
which is essential in contemporary society, and jeopardizing the possibility 
of conceiving the law as the formal mediation of different conceptions of the 
good.59 In fact, Kant leaves no doubt about the link between the law and extra-
legal discourses, in particular moral principles: indeed, both are interpreted as 
aiming at the realization of autonomy as the condition in which human beings 
– as both moral and political subjects – give themselves the rules that they 
56   A. Gentili, De jure belli libri tres, Vol. I (1933).
57  H. Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre. Einleitung in die rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik (1934) 
[Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre].
58   N. Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft (1993) [Luhmann, Recht der Gesellschaft].
59   H. Kelsen, Die philosophischen Grundlagen der Naturrechtslehre und des Rechtspositivismus 
(1928).
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ought to follow.60 Nevertheless, Kant’s morals can hardly be seen as metaphysical 
in the usual sense of the word, since morality does not in his conception resort 
to an objective truth rooted in God’s will or in nature and situated beyond and 
above the critical reflexion of individuals. Rather, Kant’s moral principles build 
a transcendental foundation for peaceful and cooperative human interaction: 
insofar as they express the fundamental rules that humans give themselves so 
as to live with each other in peace and solidarity, they are not objective but 
subjective, not substantial but formal.
Furthermore, in Kant’s approach the connection between law and morals 
guarantees three essential functions: a) a criterion for the validity of the law 
(a law that violates the principle of autonomy can be effective and in force, but 
cannot claim to be endowed with full normative validity); b) a conceptual basis 
for criticism of the existing law, as a precondition for further development of 
the legal system (on the basis of the principle of autonomy it is justifiable to 
criticize a law that violates this principle and seek its amendment); c) a definition 
of the social function of the law (a law endowed with full normativity assumes 
the function of guaranteeing autonomy in social and political interactions). The 
question now arises whether a legal system that claims to deny any extra-legal 
reference may accomplish these functions. According to Kelsen’s “Pure Theory 
of Law”, the legal system is made up of hypothetical propositions – without 
any resorting to social realities or ethical principles61 – the validity of which 
is guaranteed exclusively by the fact that their production follows the rules 
established by a higher norm. Therefore, in the formal pyramid of legal positivism 
the validity of any proposition is founded on the validity of a norm situated at a 
hierarchically higher level. Yet, the logic of such a conception leads inescapably 
to a regression ad infinitum, so that Kelsen – in order to avoid this conceptual 
shortcoming that would undermine his whole construction – creates a borderline 
concept of legal theory, the Grundnorm (fundamental norm).62 When we reach 
60  I. Kant, ‘Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten’, in I. Kant, Werkausgabe, edited by 
W. Weischedel, Vol. VII (1977), 9, 65-66; I. Kant, ‘Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag 
in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis’, in I. Kant, Werkausgabe, 
supra note 60, Vol. XI, 125, 150; I. Kant, ‘Zum Ewigen Frieden: Ein philosophischer 
Entwurf ’, in I. Kant, Werkausgabe, supra note 60, Vol. XI, 191, 204 [Kant, Zum Ewigen 
Frieden]; I. Kant, ‘Die Metaphysik der Sitten’, in I. Kant, Werkausgabe, supra note 60, 
Vol. VIII, 306, 432, para. 46; I. Kant, ‘Der Streit der Fakultäten’, in I. Kant, Werkausgabe, 
supra note 60, Vol. XI, 264, 364.
61   Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, supra note 57, 21.
62   H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (1945), 115-123 [Kelsen, General Theory]. For 
a recent analysis of the Grundnorm theory see A. Jakab, ‘Probleme der Stufenbaulehre’, 91 
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the top of the positivistic legal system’s pyramid – i.e. the constitution within 
the national legal system and, at an even higher, global level, the essential norms 
of international law – we find, according to Kelsen, sets of positive norms on 
which all other norms are grounded. Nonetheless, these positive norms, so as to 
be valid, have also themselves to be based on another, even more essential norm. 
In order to interrupt the regression ad infinitum, Kelsen describes this most 
fundamental of all norms as non-positive, namely as a pre-positive principle 
which is the source of any validity of the law. The Grundnorm may actually 
assume any content: the only quality that is essential to the pre-positive principle 
of the whole legal system is its effectiveness.63
Thus, considered in relation to his criticism of Kant, Kelsen’s proposition 
does not in the end offer any convincing solution. First, the Grundnorm turns 
out to be no less extra-legal than Kant’s morality – actually uncontroversial 
evidence that the epistemological content of the law cannot rest exclusively on 
the law itself. And, second, the content of Kelsen’s extra-legal law reference is 
eventually less convincing than Kant’s idea of morality: indeed, it guarantees far 
less than the latter an adequate standard for the normativity of the law, nor does 
it propose a rational criterion for its further development.
b) In more recent years a new attempt, based on systems theory, has 
been made to conceive of the law as a self-sufficient system. According to 
Niklas Luhmann’s theory of systems, law is an independent social system the 
function of which consists in stabilizing the normative expectations deriving 
from other social subsystems.64 According to the interpretation of society based 
on systems theory, every social subsystem produces expectations as a consequence 
of the achievement of its functions. In order to prevent the disruptive effects that 
could arise from the pretensions formulated by social actors, their expectations 
are expressed in the form of norms, and the claims appealing to these norms 
Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (2005) 3, 333.
63   Kelsen, General Theory, supra note 62, 120. H. L. A. Hart tried to avoid Kelsen’s resorting 
to the pre-positive assumption of the Grundnorm by introducing the concept of the “rule 
of recognition” see The Concept of Law, (1994), 90-96. Thus, the foundation of the legal 
system in Hart’s theory is itself a rule and not a pre-legal postulation. Nevertheless, the 
“rule of recognition” consists lastly in imposing a duty the acceptance of which is based 
on extra-legal conditions. As a result, Hart’s revised positivism shares with Kelsen’s 
conception the same flaws that seem to affect every positivist understanding of the legal 
system: first, the legal system cannot refrain from references to extra-legal circumstances; 
second, through the extra-legal conditions on which it is based legal positivism meets 
with an unreflected and normatively untamed social and political power. This way, the 
normativity of the law is largely – and dangerously – reduced to its effectiveness.
64   Luhmann, Recht der Gesellschaft, supra note 58, 131.
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are processed in formal procedures following the principles laid down by law. 
On these premises, systems theory elaborates a significantly better articulation 
of the social function of the law than Kelsen’s Grundnorm.
Nevertheless, here the assertion of the self-subsistence of the legal subsystem 
is also problematic. Systems theory claims, in fact, that the legal subsystem 
–  like any other social subsystem – only operationalizes communication that 
unfolds according to its specific internal binary code65 which is based, for this 
particular subsystem, on the contraposition between lawful and unlawful.66 
This assumption may simply mean what is self-evident in a context of social 
differentiation, namely that inputs from outside can be operationalized within 
a system only if they are translated into its own language. Systems theory 
however – at least in Luhmann’s interpretation – maintains more than just this, 
asserting that no extra-systemic actor can become part of the infra-systemic 
interaction if he does not give up his extra-systemic character, as well as that 
no external content can penetrate into the causal chain of the infra-systemic 
operations. Indeed, every subsystem not only has its own rationality but is also 
self-referential, i.e. its operational chain is impermeable to the environment.67 
Communications coming from outside are interpreted exclusively as irritations 
affecting the usual functioning of infra-systemic operations.68 In fact, no extra- 
or supra-systemic reason – i.e., a rationality rooted in the lifeworld69 – is thinkable 
in systems theory’s conception of self-contained social subsystems. According 
to this postulation, the law is also understood as a self-referential subsystem 
characterized by a self-sufficient rationality: as in Kelsen’s “Pure Theory of Law”, 
albeit following very different conceptual premises, the law would therefore be 
based exclusively on itself.
Yet, the idea of an exclusively self-reliant rationality of the legal subsystem 
meets its limits when the epistemological question is raised whether the 
membrane between system and environment can really be seen as impenetrable 
and, as a consequence, whether the adaptations of the system’s operations to the 
environment can adequately be explained merely by resorting to the concept 
of irritation. An alternative description of the relations between system and 
environment would consist in presupposing the intervention of external actors as 
65   N. Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, Vol. I (1997) [Luhmann, Gesellschaft der 
Gesellschaft].
66   Luhmann, Recht der Gesellschaft, supra note 58, 60-62.
67   Luhmann, Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, supra note 65, 95-96.
68   Ibid., 118.
69   J. Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Vol. II (1981) [Habermas, 
Kommunikatives Handeln].
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well as the raising of non-system-immanent claims within the communication 
process of the legal subsystem. From this perspective, provided that the external 
actors’ action and the non-system-immanent claims were translated into 
the language of the legal subsystem, it would be possible to explain how the 
system-immanent rationality can benefit from direct input from the lifeworld. 
Furthermore, it would not be necessary to assume – as in Luhmann’s systems 
theory – an epistemologically and sociologically problematic double-blind 
coupling between different non-communicating systems.70 The advantages of the 
approach that presupposes interaction with external actors as well as the existence 
of an extra- and supra-systemic rationality becomes evident when it comes to the 
analysis of extra- or supra-systemic phenomena like human rights protection 
and justice. The difficulties that systems theory meets in explaining these issues 
by maintaining the principle of systemic self-referentiality71 may offer sufficient 
evidence that the legal subsystem, even if relying on the conceptual organon of 
systems theory, can hardly be seen as self-sufficient: in order to understand some 
aspects of its functions the resort to forms of extra-legal rationality seems to be 
inevitable.
In conclusion, the most radical attempts to ground the system of the law 
exclusively in itself have substantially failed in their purposes: legal propositions 
are always connected to extra-legal concepts and assumptions, and on this 
connection is based the ability to interpret and further develop the law. From this 
perspective, the fact – outlined in the last section – that the norms on solidarity 
are always, as legal principles, related to non-legal arguments in order to specify 
their content should not be seen as disturbing; indeed, the legal propositions 
concerning solidarity share their epistemological status with all other legal 
propositions: in order to be understood, interpreted and developed, they have 
to be situated against a non-legal conceptual and social background. Insofar 
as legal norms – like the provisions on solidarity – are explicitly receptive for 
the discursive world outside, they should not be considered an underdeveloped 
element of the legal system. Rather, they have to be appreciated as precisely 
70   Luhmann, Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, supra note 65, 100.
71   See, e.g. A. Fischer-Lescano, Globalverfassung: Die Geltungsbegründung der Menschenrechte 
(2005); Fischer-Lescano, ‘Globalverfassung: Verfassung der Weltgesellschaft’, supra 
note 5; M. Neves, ‘Die symbolische Kraft der Menschenrechte’, 91 Archiv für Rechts- und 
Sozialphilosophie (2005), 159; G. Teubner, ‘Selbstsubversive Gerechtigkeit: Kontingenz- 
oder Transzendenzformel des Rechts?’, 29 Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie (2008) 1, 9; 
G. Teubner, ‘Die anonyme Matrix: Zu Menschenrechtsverletzungen durch „private” 
transantionale Akteure’, in W. Brugger, U. Neumann & S. Kirste (eds), Rechtsphilosophie 
im 21. Jahrhundert (2008), 440.
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that component of the corpus iuris that, more than anything else, enables it to 
be deeply rooted in social interaction. The time has thus come to reformulate 
Gentili’s motto by inviting lawyers to pay more attention to ideas coming from 
other disciplines: “animum attendite, jure consulti, ad notiones e munere alieno!”
D. Two Arguments Against Solidarity
Legal arguments have to be situated within the horizon of a broad 
understanding of practical reason so as not to lose their epistemological content 
as well as the social function of the law. This justifies an examination of the 
claims arising from extra-legal discourses that either support or undermine the 
case for solidarity as a guiding principle of law. In this overview, I will start 
with the latter strand, namely with the arguments that deny the existence of an 
obligation to take non-national interests into account within national fora. This 
approach is developed in two main variants: the first asserts that solidarity with 
non-nationals leads eventually to the destruction of the political community in 
the midst of the struggle for survival between peoples (D. I.); and the second 
claims that egoism is simply the most rational choice (D. II.).
I. Egoism as the Consequence of the Existential Struggle 
 Between Political Communities
The most ancient – and, at least for a long time, the most powerful – 
conception that excludes non-national interests and arguments from internal 
decision-making-processes is based on the assumption that the interactions 
between political communities are essentially characterized by their existential 
struggle for survival. We find this idea throughout the whole history of 
Western political and legal thought: having been first elaborated by the Greek 
historian Thucydides72, it reappeared at the dawn of modernity in the works of 
Machiavelli73 and Bodin.74 Later, it became part of the nationalistic philosophy 
from the beginning of the 19th century75 as well as of the neo-realistic theory of 
72   Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War (2009), Book V, Chapter XVII, para. 84 ff. 
73   N. Machiavelli, Il Principe (1995); N. Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito 
Livio (1997).
74   J. Bodin, Six livres de la république (1579). Bodin’s concept of sovereignty would mean 
“[...] the death of any international law [...]” as the law of coexistence and cooperation 
among states, see: H. Kipp, Völkerordnung und Völkerrecht im Mittelater (1950), 124.
75   A. Müller, Die Elemente der Staatskunst (1922); E. Lemberg, Nationalismus (1964); H. 
Kohn, Die Idee des Nationalismus: Ursprung und Geschichte bis zur Französischen Revolution 
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international relations from the middle of the 20th century.76 Lastly, on the cusp 
of the second and third millennia, it has informed the influential theory of the 
“clash of civilizations”.77
According to the core facets of the theoretical approach shared by all these 
authors, relations between political communities are largely comparable to a 
state of nature, in which no compelling legal norms situated at a level above 
the individual entities can be established. In this status naturae every social 
and political entity is largely homogeneous within its boundaries, although the 
fundamentals of this indispensable homogeneity may be quite different: from 
the mythical origins of the polis to the assumption of the polity as enlarged 
family,78 as well as from the historical, linguistic, ethnic and even racial unity 
of the nation79 to the rather religion-focussed concept of “civilisation”.80 It is 
essential to this perspective only that the other is perceived as an essential and 
existential threat to one’s own community – as an hostis or a “foe”, as Carl 
Schmitt pointed out.81
In these terms, political and legal order is possible only within the boundaries 
of the single political community, by reason of its cohesion and homogeneity. 
Against any form of universalism, order – in the sense of a social condition in 
which legal norms guarantee a peaceful and cooperative interaction – cannot 
but be particular. Beyond the borders of the individual polities no real order 
can be established, but merely a precarious limitation of disorder, a Hegung des 
Krieges preventing severely destructive and eventually annihilating outcomes for 
one’s own community.82 Yet, if the rivalry that arises between communities – for 
(1950); L. L. Snyder, Varieties of Nationalism: A Comparative Study (1976).
76   H. J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, 2nd ed. 
(1954); S. Burchill et al. (eds), Theories of International Relations (2001) 70; A. Jacobs, 
‘Realismus’, in S. Schieder & M. Spindler (eds), Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen 
(2006), 39.
77   S. P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996).
78   The idea of the familistic origin of the polity reaches, over a period of two thousand years, 
from Aristotle, Politics (1967), I, 2, 1252a ff., to Bodin, supra note 74, 1, and R. Filmer, 
Patriarcha, Or the Natural Power of Kings (1680).
79   A. D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (1986).
80   Huntington, supra note 77, 42.
81   C. Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen: Text von 1932 mit einem Vorwort und drei 
Corollarien (1963), 20, 26-28.
82   C. Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europeum (1950), 
111 ff. Arguments in favour of the limitation of the most destructive consequences of 
conflicts can also be found throughout the history of the particularistic strand of political 
thought, from Thucydides, supra note 72, Book III, Chapter 10, para. 59; Book IV, 
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instance, as a consequence of the scarcity of resources – cannot be settled through 
generally recognized procedures, the conflict may degenerate into a relentless 
struggle in which no interests of the counterpart are recognized as legitimate 
– except for the cases in which such interests coincide with those of the first 
party – nor can the arguments of the other be accepted as a truthful contribution 
to the solution of the problem. In the midst of a struggle for survival, where no 
independent perspective or procedure is established and no shared arguments 
can be developed, any claim is an instrument at the service of the particularistic 
self-affirmation of one conflicting party.
 From the perspective of an existential struggle between particularistic 
social and political communities, egoism is justified not only because, as already 
mentioned, no supra-state normative and institutional level – i.e. no legal and 
political system, with functioning, inclusive and representative international 
organizations, as well as with an independent adjudication system – exists above 
the individual polities. A second cause – an epistemological one – may, in fact, 
be considered even more significant. Indeed, within the conceptual horizon of 
the holistic understanding of the political community, in which the totality of 
each polity (the holon) is collocated clearly above its members, namely above 
individuals with their rights and interests, reason is never universal, but always 
situated. In other words, reason cannot but be deeply rooted in the hermeneutic 
context of a specific culture, language and history.83 We will, therefore, have 
our arguments, based on our reason, or arguments based on the reason of the 
others, but we will never have shared arguments arising from a common reason. 
The only rational approach that we all share is, from this point of view, the 
reason of expediency, so that the only claims of the counterpart that we can 
accept are those occasionally and casually coinciding with our egoistic priorities. 
Otherwise, the endorsement of the interests of the others always runs the risk of 
being seen as a betrayal.
Two main arguments can be developed against the extra-legal discourse 
that grounds the egoistic refusal of solidarity on the assumption of the relations 
between the polities as a state of nature. The first addresses the concept of reason. 
Indeed, if it may be difficult to reject the claim that reason always develops 
Chapter XIV, para. 118, to Plato, Republic (1980), 469c ff., until the neo-realistic theorists 
of international relations (see Morgenthau, supra note 76, 205-209 & 505-517) and even 
among the prophets of the “clash of civilizations” (see Huntington, supra note 77, 308).
83   On the contextualization of subjectivity and, therefore, of reason as one of its most 
important features see: M. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982); A. MacIntyre, 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988); R. Forst, Kontexte der Gerechtigkeit: Politische 
Philosophie jenseits von Liberalismus und Kommunitarismus (1994), 23, 306.
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against the background of a social context, it would nevertheless be incorrect 
to overlook totally those elements of rational communication that supersede 
the specific contexts, encompassing a plurality of human societies and allowing 
interactions far beyond the individual communities. Even if there are no doubts 
about the massive presence of the use of instrumental – or strategic – reason in 
human interaction, no less convincing arguments speak in favour of the existence 
of something more and else in the realm of practical reason (see infra, E.).
The second criticism that may be raised against the justification of nation-
centred egoism presented in this section has a rather teleological character. 
The question in this case is what kind of world we assume that we are living 
in, and whether this assumption may not presume a – perhaps unintended – 
perlocutionary dimension. In other words, if we deny solidarity because we 
understand the world as a status naturae, we make – precisely by assuming 
that and by acting, as a consequence, egoistically – a decisive contribution to 
shaping the world exactly that way, namely as a state of nature. And in the status 
naturae the life of the political communities, like the life of individuals before 
the contract that created the commonwealth, cannot but be “[...] solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish, and short.”84 Therefore, if a political community wants to have a 
wealthy, cultivated and long life, it should commit itself to leaving the state of 
nature: exeundum est e statu naturae.
II. The Egoistic Choice as Rational Choice
If we assume that rationality is not a universal quality with which every 
human is endowed but, on the contrary, that it is always embedded in social 
contexts and thus particularistic in its essence, it will not be surprising that the 
only rational perspective for action will consist in the egoistic defence of the 
interests of one’s own community. Nonetheless, a further approach has recently 
been developed in order to reject solidarity with the others, which is based on 
a universal understanding of rationality. In particular, Jack L. Goldsmith and 
Eric A. Posner resort in their analysis of the limits of international law to the 
rational choice theory so as to demonstrate the low normative level of the rules 
that should bring order to relations among states.85
Beginning with the assumption that every rational actor will prefer the 
choice that promises to obtain the highest immediate payoffs, and arguing that 
84   T. Hobbes, Leviathan, or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical 
and Civil (1651), Chapt. XIII, 99.
85   J. L. Goldsmith & E. A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (2005).
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states, in international relations, always face the possibility of being trapped in 
a situation comparable to that of the prisoner’s dilemma, Goldsmith and Posner 
maintain that every rationally acting state, given the fact that the behavior of its 
counterparts turns out to be unpredictable in the most cases, cannot but pursue 
its own egoistic interest. Neither customary international law nor treaty law 
can build a reliable normative framework of shared and effective rules, really 
able to guarantee the stable proceduralization of conflict solution as well as, 
in the most favorable cases, cooperation. States thus comply with international 
law only insofar as this compliance coincides with their immediate and egoistic 
interests, so that the legal framework of relations among political communities 
is left with a very modest normative consistency.
The first element that differentiate Goldsmith and Posner’s justification 
of particularistic egoism from the naturalistic conception of the inescapable 
struggle for survival among peoples concerns the method that is applied here. 
Usually, the capacity for self-interested rational choice is thought to be shared 
by all humans, building a basis for an understanding beyond any predetermined 
individual or collective identity. In Hobbes’ and Locke’s contractualistic state 
theory self-interested rationality builds the strongest motivation to create the 
societas civilis. On the contrary, in Goldsmith and Posner’s approach – and here 
is the first great novelty of their proposal – the preference for self-interested 
(or instrumental) rationality is the strongest argument for denying any chance to 
build a societas civilis among states. Second, the rejection of solidarity has usually 
been justified by pointing out the centrality of the pre-reflexive identity of the 
community. Once again in the face of the prevailing philosophical, political 
and legal tradition, Goldsmith and Posner base their argument on the principle 
of democratic participation, therefore on the most reflexive decision-making 
procedure. And while for many legal philosophers people’s participation was the 
best guarantee of freedom and of a universalistic understanding of inter-state 
interaction,86 they see in it the most powerful obstacle against such a hopeful 
perspective. For that reason, they claim that precisely the democratic states will 
be particularly reluctant – not least because of their democratic tradition and 
praxis – to comply with international law when this compliance runs counter to 
their own interests.87
86   Just to remind one of the most prominent example in the history of political thought 
see: Kant, ‘Zum Ewigen Frieden’, supra note 60, 204-208. For a recent upholding of the 
democratic peace thesis see R. J. Delahunty & J. Yoo, ‘Kant, Habermas and Democratic 
Peace’, 10 Chicago Journal of International Law (2009-2010) 2, 437.
87   Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 85, 212.
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The egoistical attitude against the others based on rational choice theory 
raises some methodological concerns as regards the theory understanding here 
displayed.
First, it is problematic to extend the rational choice approach, conceived 
in order to interpret the behaviour of individuals, to collective entities like 
states, which are themselves composed of a plurality of individuals and social 
groups with articulated and sometimes diverging interests.88 The justification 
that the billiard ball approach, considering every single state as a unity, albeit 
“far from perfect”, would be simply “[...] parsimonious [...]”,89 – in the sense 
that it would allow one usefully to reduce the number and complexity of the 
analysed phenomena in order to concentrate on the most significant among 
them – cannot really remove the sense of an epistemological shortcoming. Nor 
can the consideration that “[both] ordinary language and history suggest that 
States have agency and thus can be said to make decisions and act on the basis of 
identifiable goals” be convincing.90 Such an understanding seems to be somehow 
old-fashioned in a world in which state agency is challenged both at the infra-
state and at the supra-state level.
Second, Goldsmith and Posner’s definition of the elements the evaluation 
of which essentially contributes to making a choice rational may be considered 
short-sighted insofar as it excludes factors like “[...] reputation [...]” and 
“[...] reciprocity [...]”.91 Furthermore – and third – Goldsmith and Posner do not 
distinguish clearly between immediate payoffs and mid- as well as long-term 
interests.92
88   As regards the disaggregation of the billiard ball state into a differentiated structure 
comprehending different social components in the neo-liberal State and law theory see: 
A. Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics’, 
51 International Organization (1997) 4, 513; A.-M. Slaughter, ‘International Law 
in a World of Liberal States’, 6 European Journal of International Law (1995) 4, 503; 
A.-M. Slaughter, ‘A Liberal Theory of International Law’, in P. B. Stephan & S. J. Baily 
(eds), Proceedings of the 94th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law 
(2000), 240; A.-M. Slaughter, International Law and International Relations, in Collected 
Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 285 (2000), 9.
89   Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 85, 6.
90   Ibid., 5.
91   A. T. Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (2008), 33.
92   The distinction between utilitas praesens and utilitas maxima is well-known in the 
history of political thought. To mention just two examples, see Hobbes, supra note 84, 
Chapt.  XIII ff., and also the “Prolegomena” of Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis 
(1995), No. 18.
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Fourth, they presuppose that states interact exclusively vis-à-vis each 
other, i.e. that they are not embedded in a broader and multipolar context. 
Moreover, state interaction is always seen as an individual and unique event, 
excluding from the consideration any form of iteration. Yet, the application 
of instrumental rationality may lead to the conclusion that cooperation and 
solidarity are irrational and that egoism is the most rational choice only if we 
collocate the actors within an abstract horizon, quite different from that in which 
they usually act. Indeed, interactions – even those among international actors – 
happen normally within multilateral contexts and include iteration. From this 
perspective, the attitude of international actors will be significantly more prone 
to complying with international law and, generally, less hostile to cooperation 
since they would take into account possible remuneration or retaliation in the 
next rounds of interaction.93 Besides, the actions of international actors are not 
bipolar but multipolar, constructing the framework of collective actions that help 
us to understand cooperation.94 The contexts of multipolar iterative interactions 
have been described as international regimes.95 Within these regimes, international 
law takes the role of the normative element that decisively contributes to shaping 
actors’ interactions, making them predictable.
Fifth – and last – according to the understanding of rationality proposed 
by Goldsmith and Posner, actors have predefined preferences which do not 
change during interaction. Nonetheless, evidence shows that preferences shift in 
the course of interactions.96 This fact may be explained still within the horizon 
of instrumental rationality, namely by admitting that the information exchange, 
albeit maintaining the priority of individual interests, nevertheless modifies the 
concrete contents of the original preferences. But it can also be seen as a clue 
to the effectiveness of a non-instrumental rationality.97 We have three possible 
interpretations in this case: according to the first one, it has been claimed that 
resorting to communicative action in the context of international negotiations 
93   R. O. Keohane, After Hegemony (1984) 75-78.
94   Ibid., 76-78.
95   Ibid., 78-80, 85-109.
96   N. Deitelhoff, ‘Was vom Tage übrig blieb. Inseln der Überzeugung im vermachteten 
Alltagsgeschäft internationalen Regierens’, in P. Niesen & B. Herborth (eds), Anarchie der 
kommunikativen Freiheit (2007), 26; T. Risse, ‘Global Governance und kommunikatives 
Handeln’, in Niesen & Herborth (eds), supra note 96, 57; H. Müller, ‘Internationale 
Verhandlungen, Argumente und Verständigungshandeln’ in Niesen & Herborth (eds), 
supra note 96, 199.
97   On the deployment, in general, of non-instrumental rationality in international relations 
see the contributions in Niesen & Herborth (eds), supra note 96.
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really shapes a shared setting of value-oriented preferences and motivations to 
action among the actors involved, eventually leading even the most egoistic 
interaction participants to non-egoistic preferences.98 Following the second 
one, the shared background of values is not created, at first, by introducing 
communicative arguments and by performing communicative actions, but is 
always already present as a contextual precondition to any interaction.99 The 
third interpretation – like the first – maintains the transcendental (and non-
contextual) character of communicative reason, but does not follow its ambitious 
claim that communicative (i.e. non-strategic and, therefore, universalistic and 
non-egoistic) arguments really transform the preferences of egoistic actors into 
solidarity;100 the supporters of this approach rather limit themselves to asserting 
that communicative reason creates a normative background that even the most 
egoistic participants in the interaction cannot dare to ignore.101
These considerations are sufficient to raise some doubts about the rationality 
of egoistic choice. However, if the exclusive focus on one’s own interests is not 
as rational as its supporters claim, the question arises, now, which alternatives 
we have, i.e. the rationality standards of the extra-legal arguments for solidarity.
E. Four Reasons for Solidarity
Of the four main arguments that have been elaborated to justify solidarity 
as well as the opening up of the forum to the others, the first is based – like the 
second justification of egoism in international relations – on the instrumental 
conception of reason, yet collocated here in the context of a much broader 
understanding (E. I.). On the other hand, the further justifications of solidarity 
top the horizon of strategic thinking, albeit in quite different ways: in the first 
case through the quasi-metaphysical postulation of a community of human 
beings, made one by shared values and interests (E. II.); in the second case 
98   H. Müller, ‘Internationale Beziehungen als kommunikatives Handeln’, 1 Zeitschrift für 
Internationale Beziehungen (1994) 1, 15; T. Risse, ‘“Let’s Argue!”: Communicative Action 
in World Politics’, 54 International Organization (2000) 1, 1. Recently, H. Müller has 
partially reoriented his position; see infra note 99.
99   This second interpretation, which may be seen as a modification and a attenuation of the 
first one, can be traced back to some recent works of H. Müller; see, in particular Müller, 
supra note 98.
100   While preference shifts during negotiations can be scientifically proved, the motivations 
of those shifts remain largely inscrutable to empirical inquiries.
101   J. Habermas, ‘Kommunikative Rationalität und grenzüberschreitende Politik: eine 
Replik’, in Niesen & Herborth (eds), supra note 96, 406, 439 [Habermas, Kommunikative 
Rationalität].
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by resorting to a pre-reflexive attitude to empathy (E. III.); in the third case 
by relying on the normative dimension of the multilevel interaction between 
humans (E. IV.).
I. Enlightened Self-Interest
In an earlier section (D. II.) resort to instrumental rationality was analysed 
as a justification of egoism. However, it has also been said that, from a broader 
perspective, self-interest can also be considered as an argument in favour of 
solidarity. In this sense, the utilitas praesens does not coincide with the utilitas 
maxima.102 Indeed, even if egoism is thought to bring immediate payoffs, a more 
open attitude towards the others may turn out to be of greater advantage in the 
long run. Among the reasons for this kind of enlightened self-interest the most 
significant is probably the consideration that taking into account the interests 
of the counterparts reduces the risks of conflict, therefore also improving the 
chances of self-preservation and self-realization. Furthermore, the transfer of 
resources to others as well as the acceptance of some of their requests may, in 
some situations, induce secondary benefits for the solidaristic party – as, for 
instance, in the cases of greater economic growth due to the increased economic 
and financial solidity of the counterpart, or of a reduction in environmental 
impact as a consequence of the introduction of environmental technologies or of 
easier access to financial resources.
This approach – which has also been labelled, with a concept that verges on 
an oxymoron, as “self-centred solidarity”103 – maintains, however, that a rational 
action must always aim at maximizing the gains of the individual actor, as well 
as that these gains, generally, must be clearly measurable in terms of concrete 
payoffs. Against this background, two situations can be singled out in which 
solidarity, even in the long run, would not be a rational, benefit-maximizing 
choice. The first occurs when an individual actor enjoys a significant economic, 
social, ideological and military predominance. In this context, the actor does not 
need to fear any harm, even in the long run, from the actions of its counterparts. 
The hegemonic state would control global interactions in such a way that there 
would no longer be any difference between utilitas praesens and utilitas maxima. 
As a consequence, short-term egoistic preferences, from the point of view of the 
maximization of individual gains, would be the most rational choice.
102   See supra note 92.
103   Hestermeyer, supra note 42, 50.
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If such an unrestrained hegemonic situation may be considered to be an 
exception – history teaches us that even the most powerful states have never 
been invulnerable as well as that their hegemony was always destined to come 
to an end – the second scenario, on the other hand, depicts the rather usual 
condition of interactions based on fundamentally egoistic rational choices. 
If rational choices always aim at maximizing individual payoffs, and if solidarity 
is justified only because of greater advantages in the mid- and long-term, the 
question remains unanswered how we could – from a factual as well as from an 
argumentative point of view – meet the attitude of the so-called free-riders. Free-
riders are those interaction participants who comply with the rules of interaction 
– in our case: with the rules which guarantee an essential level of recognition 
for the arguments of the others – just as long as they see in this behaviour a 
gain for themselves. In other words, they are always prone to breaking the rules 
as soon as they see a greater advantage to them from such a breach: under the 
premises of the definition of rationality as the maximization of individual gains, 
there can be no doubts that the behaviour of the free-rider appears to be the 
most rational choice here. Yet, it is difficult to imagine under these conditions 
how social interaction can be stabilized. As regards the rational preconditions 
for a functioning democracy, it has been argued that instrumental rationality 
cannot build the dispositional foundation that is indispensable for a society of 
citizens committed to achieving freedom and justice.104 The same can be said 
with reference to the dispositional framework of international relations aiming 
to concretize peace, mutual recognition, the guarantee of fundamental rights 
and justice.
Overcoming short-sighted egotism in international relations cannot be 
considered, therefore, to be just a question of opportunity or of an enlightened 
expediency in the sense of a self-reflexive maximization of individual gains. 
Indeed, altruism and solidarity will always remain shaky if they are based on the 
instrumental use of reason. To be fully developed, they have necessarily to be 
derived from a universalistic-transcendental approach: only a non-egoistic use of 
reason can give us the conceptual elements to claim that opening minds – and 
hearts – to the arguments of the weak and powerless is an obligation. In order 
104   K.-O. Apel, Diskurs und Verantwortung: Das Problem des Übergangs zur postkonventionellen 
Moral (1990) 26-28, 55-63 [Apel, Diskurs und Verantwortung]; K.-O. Apel, ‘Das Anliegen 
des anglo-amerikanischen “Kommunitarismus“ in der Sicht der Diskursethik: Worin 
liegen die ‘kommunitären’ Bedingungen der Möglichkeit einer post-konventionellen 
Identität der Vernunftperson?’, in M. Brumlik & H. Brunkhorst (eds), Gemeinschaft und 
Gerechtigkeit (1993), 149, 152-162.
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to make the forum accessible to the others, the quest for a non-instrumental 
concept of rationality seems therefore to be unavoidable: only a post-instrumental 
rationality, if anything, can lead us to the realization of solidarity.
II. The Moral Duty to Exercise Solidarity Within the 
 International Community, Understood as a Community   
 Sharing Universal Values and Interests
While the claim to an enlightened self-interest is grounded on the 
presumption of actors primarily pursuing their own interests, the second extra-
legal justification supporting the principle of solidarity is based on precisely 
the opposite approach, namely on the assumption of a natural sociability of 
humans, a condition that would lead, in the end, to a universal community of 
humankind. This community would share fundamental values and interests, 
so that universal solidarity would be the evident and quasi-natural result of the 
basic anthropological condition of human beings.
The idea of a universal community of humankind is a frequent topos of 
political thought. Albeit traceable back as far as to the concept of οικέιωσις of 
the Stoic philosophy, it is in early modernity that the concept became one of the 
core elements of the emerging theory of international law. Indeed, we find the 
reference to the corpus universale of humanity in such numerous and different 
authors as – to mention just some among the most important – Francisco Suarez,105 
Johannes Althusius,106 Alberico Gentili,107 Hugo Grotius,108 Samuel Pufendorf,109 
and Christian Wolff.110 In the 20th century, it was introduced anew – after a time 
in which the idea of a universal humanity had fallen into eclipse – first by Viktor 
Cathrein111 and then, with a significantly greater impact, by Alfred Verdross. In 
particular, it was the international lawyer and legal philosopher Verdross who 
105   F. Suárez, ‘De legibus, ac Deo legislatore’, in Suárez, supra note 3, Vol. II, Chapt. XIX, 
No. 9, 348.
106   On Althusius’ concept of corpus consociationis universalis see J. Althusius, Politica methodice 
digesta (1932), Chapt. IX, No. 22, 92.
107   A. Gentili, De jure belli libri tres (1933), Vol. I, Chapt. XV, 107.
108   Grotius’ “Prolegomena”, supra note 92, No. 6, No. 16 & No. 17.
109   S. Pufendorf, De jure naturae et gentium libri octo (1995), Book II, Chapter II, No. VII; 
Book II, Chapter III, No. XV; Book VIII, Chapter VI ff.; S. Pufendorf, De officio hominis 
et civis libri duo (1927) Book I, Chapt. VIII.
110   C. Wolff, Institutiones juris naturae et gentium (1750) Book IX, Chapter I, No. V. 
111   V. Cathrein, Die Grundlage des Völkerrechts (1918), 45; V. Cathrein, Moralphilosophie, 
6th ed., Vol. I (1924), 111.
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collocated the assumption of a corpus universale of humankind at the basis of a 
theory of international law as the constitution of the international community112 – 
a theory which has remained influential until today.113
The starting point of Verdross’ considerations lies in his criticism of 
some aspects of Kelsen’s conception of the legal system. Although Verdross 
largely endorses Kelsen’s monistic approach114 as well as the priority assigned to 
international law within the hierarchical legal system,115 he is sceptical about the 
content that Kelsen gives to the concept of Grundnorm. Verdross substantially 
accepts the idea of the Grundnorm as the basis of a unitary and hierarchically 
organized legal system,116 but rejects its formalistic interpretation as it has been 
elaborated by the doctrine of legal positivism: a merely formalistic principle 
can justify the formal validity of the legal norms as an ought, a Sein-Sollendes, 
but cannot give us any arguments about its objective validity. Indeed – as we 
have seen before117 – the positivistic Grundnorm, which is originally empty, is 
eventually filled with nothing more than the effectiveness of power. In order to 
avoid swinging between empty formalism and crude power, which can account 
for our factual respect for the law but not for the reasons why this respect should 
be seen as just, Verdross claims that the Grundnorm needs to be traced back 
to objective values.118 The Grundnorm should be identified, therefore, with an 
objective principle that pre-exists individuals as well as their political and legal 
institutions, i.e. with an idea of a cosmic order as it had been conceived by the 
legal philosophy of natural law.119
In Verdross’ interpretation the reference to the corpus universale of 
humankind is rather an implicit corollary of a broader pantheistic conception 
of cosmic order as the basis of moral and legal norms – a conception originally 
inspired by Plato’s120 and Hegel’s121 metaphysics. In the decades following the 
publication of Verdross’ seminal work, the authors who have resorted to the 
112   A. Verdross, Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft (1926).
113   On the theory of the international community see: A. L. Paulus, Die internationale 
Gemeinschaft im Völkerrecht: Eine Untersuchung zur Entwicklung des Völkerrechts im 
Zeitalter der Globalisierung (2001).
114   Verdross, supra note 112, 34-42.
115   Ibid., 33-34.
116   Ibid., 12.
117   See supra, at C., a).
118   Verdross, supra note 112, 23.
119   Ibid., 22 & 32.
120   Ibid., 32.
121   Ibid., 2-3.
246 GoJIL 6 (2014) 2, 217-257
natural law as the fundamental criterion for the objective validity of the law and 
as the justification of an international law aiming at cooperation and solidarity, 
have progressively refined their proposal from the pantheistic elements of Verdross’ 
conception.122 As a consequence, the assumption of a universal community of 
humankind was left as the main – if not the only – pillar intended to support the 
entire legal system, with international law at its top, aiming at achieving a basic 
solidarity among all human beings. The international community is defined as 
“an ensemble of rules, procedures and mechanisms designed to protect collective 
interests of humankind, based on a perception of commonly shared values.”123 
Against this background, international law – or, at least, the most general part 
of it – is the legal expression of the activity of the international community and 
the most striking evidence of its existence. In other words, international law 
– as “[the] Common Law of Mankind”124 – arises as the formalization of shared 
values as well as of the rules that guarantee the protection of common interests. 
Indeed,
“like a people which through the process of establishing its political 
constitution reaches agreement on a set of basic values which should 
determine the general course of the common journey into the 
future, the nations of the world, too, need a set of shared values in 
order for them to be classified as an international community”.125
However, unlike the constitutional rules of individual states, the common 
values enshrined in international law are not essentially the result of deliberative 
and inclusive processes, but are, rather, already present in re as an objective fact 
of reason. The rational observer simply has to recognize them, international 
law has to assume and formalize them, and international adjudication has to 
make them effective. The international community, therefore, is not something 
to be built – as in the perspective of the communicative paradigm126 – but is 
122   See H. Mosler, The International Society as a Legal Community (1980); B. Simma, From 
Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law, in Collected Courses of The Hague 
Academy of International Law, Vol. 250 (1994), 217; R. S. J. Macdonald, ‘The International 
Community as a Legal Community’, in Macdonald & Johnston, supra note 47, 853.
123   C. Tomuschat, International Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New 
Century, Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 281 (1999), 
88.
124   C. W. Jenks, The Common Law of Mankind (1958).
125   Tomuschat, supra note 123, 78.
126   See infra, D. IV.
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a previously existing ontological reality, characterized by common values 
and interests.127 From this point of view, having assumed access to a kind of 
ontological truth, it is not surprising that the exponents of the theory of the 
international community dedicate little interest to deliberative processes due 
to determinate common rules as well as to the conditions of legitimacy of such 
rules, and prefer to concentrate on the role of international tribunals as the 
interpreters and executors of an objective principle of justice.
The idea of the “perfect community”, living in universal harmony, as the 
ultimate natural goal of all human persons and of all communities has also 
been explicitly claimed by contemporary natural law philosophy.128 The close 
relationship between the justification for solidarity, within the conceptual 
horizon of international law theory, by resorting to the community of all humans 
and the noble and long intellectual tradition of natural law, from antiquity until 
the present time, does not, however, guarantee the epistemological quality of the 
claim. Indeed, the case for solidarity depends here on the epistemological status 
of the proposition that “a universal human community exists which shares 
fundamental interests and values.” In assessing the epistemological quality of 
this proposition is has to be pointed out that the expression cannot correspond 
to any kind of analytic judgement because the assertions that such a community 
exists, as well as that any such community shares values and interests, are not 
originally contained in the subject of the proposition. Thus, the proposition 
must be a synthetic judgement, aimed at reaching some knowledge of the world. 
On this knowledge of the world – and not just on a formalistic derivation 
system, as is claimed by the theory of the self-sufficient legal system – is based 
the whole corpus iuris. Furthermore, the judgement is a priori because it aims 
at building assertions that are necessary and universally valid. Yet, from a post-
metaphysical approach, a synthetic a priori judgement – i.e. a proposition that 
makes an assertion of necessary and universal validity and claims to improve 
our knowledge of the world – can be acceptable only if it is based on empirical 
evidence about phenomena. Furthermore the proposition, relying upon empirical 
evidence, must be falsifiable, i.e. it must be open to correction as a consequence 
of new empirical data about phenomena which may be incompatible with the 
previous assertion. Yet, the assertion that “a universal human community exists 
which shares fundamental interests and values” does not satisfy either of the 
above-mentioned consistency conditions. Indeed, empirical evidence of such a 
127   M. Payandeh, Internationales Gemeinschaftsrecht (2010).
128   G. Grisez, J. Boyle & J. Finnis, ‘Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends’, in 
J. Finnis (ed), Natural Law, Vol. I (1991), 237, 269.
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universal human community is rather controversial – the realistic assumption 
of a permanent struggle for survival between human communities reveals 
significant evidence to the contrary – and the assertion, not being based on 
empirical evidence, cannot be falsified either.
On these terms, the argument for the existence of a universal human 
community turns out to be the result of the quasi-metaphysical ontologization 
of a transcendental capacity with which all humans are endowed, namely the 
faculty to interact communicatively with each other. In other words, the theory 
of the international community seems to draw from the transcendental capacity 
to interact and to search for consensus in a communicative way a presumed 
ontological fact that nevertheless lacks proper evidence. From a post-metaphysical 
perspective, the universal human community is something to be built and a task 
to be accomplished, not a reality to be simply discovered. The existence of the 
transcendental capacity of universal communication gives us the hope necessary 
to succeed in the ambitious purpose of construing a universal community of all 
human beings; an ontological certainty is, nonetheless, out of our reach.
III. Solidarity as Empathy
While the theory of the universal human community grounds its claim 
for solidarity on an alleged ontological truth, the next strand of international 
lawyers defending the case for solidarity follows the opposite strategy to reach 
the same goal: where the former resorts to ontology, the latter denies any basis 
in re or even in a universal conception of reason. Within this strand, solidarity 
is not a deducible universal duty simply because no ontological foundation 
for universal rationality is presumed to exist. The rejection of universalism is 
philosophically justified by resorting to the postmodern critique of modern 
rationalism and subjectivity.
According to the main strand of modern philosophy – from Descartes129 
to Kant130 – the claim for universal rationality was founded on the universal 
features of subjectivity. Universal subjectivity – understood as the abstraction 
and generalization of the higher intellectual faculties with which every 
individual is endowed – would guarantee the truth of theoretical knowledge 
as well as the general validity of moral and political principles. Lastly, if we 
share the same subjectivity – or, from an ontological point of view, if we are all 
part of a macroanthropic subjectivity – solidarity is due as a commandment of 
129   R. Descartes, Meditationes de Prima Philosophia, Vol. II (1642), 78, 82.
130   I. Kant, ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’, in Kant, supra note 60, Vol. III-IV, 136 (B, 132).
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reason. In recent decades, however, this construction has been heavily attacked 
by postmodern criticism. The direction of the attack has been twofold. First, it 
has been argued that subjectivity is not the bulwark of freedom, justice as well as 
of scientific, moral and social progress, but a construct conceived by the power 
holders in order to justify the unequal distribution of resources and, eventually, 
to oppress the powerless.131 Second, the concept of subjectivity itself has been 
deconstructed by showing that it is not as unitary as modern philosophy assumed, 
being a composite notion made of a plurality of discursive strategies: precisely 
in this plurality – and not in resorting to an allegedly superior universal and 
unitary subjectivity – lies the possibility to self-affirmation and self-realization 
for the concrete individuals.132
Translated into the language of legal theory – and, in particular, of the 
theory of international law – postmodern criticism against unitary and universal 
subjectivism has assumed the form of the rejection of the unity of the legal 
system as a desirable aim (i.e. as the best guarantee of the normative quality 
of the law) and as a possible reality, regardless of whether already present or 
future. From this point of view, the project of the “constitutionalization of 
international law”133 is neither feasible nor attractive, and the fragmentation 
of the law should not be seen as a threatening perspective.134 Furthermore, 
according to the postmodern approach, international law is not the legal 
expression of an ontological, moral or epistemological universal truth: swinging 
necessarily between apology and utopia, its norms and practices miss objectivity 
and, thus, universal validity.135 The criticism of the universalistic claim of the 
international law discourse nevertheless does not lead to sheer nihilism. Indeed, 
the international law theorists influenced by postmodern thinking accept – as 
does in particular Martti Koskenniemi, as one of the most significant among 
them – the idea that some experiences may occur which are not characterized 
131   M. Foucault, L’ordre du discours (1971); M. Foucault, Histoire de la folie à l’ âge classique 
(1961); M. Foucault, Les mots et les choses (1966); M. Foucault, Surveiller et punir (1975); 
M. Foucault, Histoire de la sexualité, I: La volonté de savoir (1976); M. Foucault, ‘The 
Subject and Power’, in H. L. Dreyfus & P. Rabinow (eds), Michel Foucault: Beyond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics (1982), 208.
132   M. Foucault, L’archéologie du savoir (1969).
133   On the “constitutionalization of international law” see: B. Fassbender, UN Security 
Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective (1998); S. Kadelbach & 
T. Kleinlein, ‘Überstaatliches Verfassungsrecht’, 44 Archiv des Völkerrechts (2006) 3, 235.
134   M. Koskenniemi, ‘International Legislation Today: Limits and Possibilities’, 23 Wisconsin 
International Law Journal (2005) 1, 61, 78.
135   M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument 
(1989) [Koskenniemi, Utopia]. 
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by mere contingency but, on the contrary, assume a kind of universal scope.136 
From the postmodern standpoint, however, this unassuming universality is 
not based on abstract ontological, moral or epistemological principles, but is 
derived from the continuity of the concrete experience of vulnerability among 
all individuals involved.
According to Koskenniemi, artistic expression is probably the most suitable 
way to give voice to the universal reach of a humanity made of concrete human 
beings.137 But legal discourse can also play a role in accomplishing this task. In 
fact, due to its formalism,138 the law makes it possible that, “[engaging] in legal 
discourse, persons recognize each other as carriers of rights and duties [...]”139 
which “belong to every member of the community in that position”.140 Through 
the law – Koskenniemi adds – “[what] otherwise would be a mere private 
violation, a wrong done to me, a violation of my interest, is transformed [...] into 
a violation against everyone in my position, a matter of concern for the political 
community itself.”141 Following Koskenniemi’s interpretation, there is a non-
ontological, non-moral and non-epistemological universalism that originates 
specifically from legal formalism. Yet, doubts arise whether this postmodern 
version of law’s universalism can really justify the claim for solidarity as an 
obligation. Indeed, if no epistemological argument aiming for the universality of 
international law is convincing, then the universal dimension of legal formalism 
is not an assertion either that every human being has to share. Koskenniemi 
recognizes the problem and switches from a universal obligation to protect the 
rights of the weak and the powerless to an individual commitment. Thus, taking 
the reasons of the others into account is not a duty the accomplishment of which 
can be demanded from every human being, but it is a task that committed people 
assume because of their specific sensibility – or empathy – towards the suffering 
of their fellow humans. As regards the profession of the lawyer, Koskenniemi’s 
approach leads explicitly to a pleading in favour of the role of legal advisers, who 
skilfully use the instruments put at their disposal by the formalism of the law 
136   M. Koskenniemi, ‘International Law in Europe between Tradition and Renewal’, 16 
European Journal of International Law (2005) 1, 113, 119-21.
137   Ibid., 120.
138   M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and fall of International Law 
1870–1960 (2001), 500-505.
139   M. Koskenniemi, ‘International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration’, 17 Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs (2004) 2, 197, 214.
140   Ibid.
141   Ibid.
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in order to suggest solutions for the achievement of what they consider to be 
“a better society”.142
As a political plan to improve the ethical stand of the legal profession, 
Koskenniemi’s idea is highly valuable. Nevertheless, it says little about the 
presumed obligation to take into account the interests of the others. And this 
substantial aphasia on the question is actually due to a substantial limitation. 
In fact, personal commitment based on empathy – regardless of how important 
empathy may be as a motivation of personal action143 – cannot offer a solid basis 
for a legal system necessarily related to the essential quality of the law as an ought: 
empathy is fundamental but personal; the law, on the other hand, specifies the 
compelling rules that guarantee order in the interactions of an entire society – 
in the case of international law even of the world society. Moreover, it is almost 
impossible to justify the establishment of institutions with the task of fostering 
better consideration of the interests of the others by barely resorting to personal 
empathic attitudes. Therefore, solidarity may feed upon empathy as regards the 
mind-set of individuals, but it must rest on a psychologically neutral command 
of reason if it has to be seen as a general moral and legal duty and if it is to be 
adequately substantiated by rules and practices.
IV. The Protection of the Universal Interaction of Human Beings 
 in a Multilevel Setting, According to the Communicative   
 Paradigm
From the critique of the previous arguments in favour of solidarity the 
conclusion can be drawn that a consistent case for taking into account the 
interests of the others a) should be grounded on a non-instrumental use of 
practical reason, b) should refrain from resorting to metaphysical assumptions, 
and finally c) should rest on the commandments of a post-metaphysical universal 
reason and not just on individual mind-sets and attitudes. A convincing answer 
to these challenges can be articulated on the basis of the communicative 
paradigm of action.144
From the point of view of the communicative paradigm, society is made 
not only by functional systems but also by a lifeworld of intersubjective relations, 
142   Koskenniemi, Utopia, supra note 135, 495. 
143   On an understanding of solidarity based on empathy see: R. Rorty, Contingency, Irony, 
and Solidarity (1989).
144   K.-O. Apel, Transformation der Philosophie (1973) [Apel, Transformation]; Apel, Diskurs 
und Verantwortung, supra note 104; Habermas, Kommunikatives Handeln, supra note, 69.
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which is characterized by different forms of interaction. In order to be well-
ordered, which means peaceful, cooperative and effective, social interaction needs 
rules. When rules are positive and compelling, they are defined – following the 
communicative interpretation of society – as laws. Thus, the task of the legal 
system consisting in stabilizing normative expectations – a view that has been 
outlined by systems theory – is not related here only or even just primarily to the 
performances of the functional subsystems, but refers rather to intersubjective 
interactions or to the tension- and conflict-filled relationship between lifeworld 
and functional subsystems. Lastly, the corpus iuris that regulates a frame of 
common concern is referred to as public law.
In his political writings and, in particular, in his philosophical essay on the 
conditions for a Perpetual Peace Kant introduces a visionary three-part division 
of public law, as the normative regulation of social interactions characterized by 
public relevance.145 Jürgen Habermas, as the most influential exponent of the 
theory of communicative action, retrieves Kant’s idea, adding however a further 
distinction at the third level of public law.
α) The first level consists of what Kant called the ius civitatis, namely the 
law “formed in accordance with the right of citizenship of the individuals who 
constitute a people.”146 This level corresponds, according to Habermas, to the 
rules, based on representative and participative legitimation, that govern social 
and political relations within democratic states.147
β) The second level is identified by Kant with the ius gentium, i.e. with 
the law, “the principle of which is international law which determines the 
relations of states.”148 Following his predecessor, Habermas describes the classic 
international law as the corpus iuris in which national states regulate their 
converging or overlapping interests, yet without any attempt to establish these 
rules as characterized by universal validity.149
γ) At the third level Kant collocates – for the first time in the history 
of political and legal thought – the ius cosmopoliticum as the law “insofar as 
individuals and states, standing in an external and mutual relation, may 
be regarded as citizens of a universal state of humankind.”150 Habermas 
distinguishes here, within the general context of the “constitutionalization of 
145   Kant, ‘Zum ewigen Frieden’, supra note 60, 203.
146   Ibid. (translation by the author).
147   Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung, supra note 52.
148   Kant, ‘Zum ewigen Frieden’, supra note 60, 203 (translation by the author).
149   J. Habermas, Der gespaltene Westen (2001), 117-122.
150   Kant, ‘Zum ewigen Frieden’, supra note 60, 203 (translation by the author).
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international law,” two different legal and institutional frameworks.151 γ1) The 
first is what he calls the transnational law, which could also be described as a 
post-classic international law dealing with matters of global concern. It is created 
(either as treaty law or as interpretation of customary law) by national states 
in order to formulate and implement rules regarding fields of general interest, 
like energy, environment, trade, financial transfers and economy. This global 
international law differs from the mere inter-state treaty praxis of the classic, i.e. 
non-constitutional, international law as its rules and practices do not just affect 
the interests of the political communities involved but shape common concerns 
on a worldwide scale. γ2) The second framework is constituted by supra-state 
– or supranational – law, characterized by institutions, essentially a reformed 
UN, endowed with normative authority as regards the protection of peace 
and essential human rights. This is the cosmopolitan law in the proper sense of 
the word which, unlike the still state-oriented global dimension of post-classic 
international law, is directly addressed to individuals as the citizens of the world. 
Outside the borders of single states, individuals meet and interact with each 
other regardless of their belonging to a specific political community. The level 
γ) of public law consists precisely in those rules and principles that guarantee a 
peaceful and cooperative interaction between humans within this most general 
context, beyond the status of being citizens of an individual state. Such norms 
contain the fundamental recognition that we owe to every human being as the 
consequence of the universal capacity to communicate. In this sense, solidarity 
is a moral obligation and its essential principles and rules have to be laid down 
necessarily as a fundamental part of the most universal corpus of public law, 
in the sense either of an interpretation of the lex lata, or of a contribution to 
the lex ferenda. Basing the case for solidarity on the communicative paradigm, 
i.e. interpreting it as part of the normative protection towards that kind of 
communication that occurs when individuals interact within the most general 
horizon, helps to avoid the shortcomings of the above-mentioned approaches: 
a) solidarity is not regarded as a result of a farsighted expediency because 
communication is an expression of a post-instrumental use of practical reason;152 
151   Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung, supra note 52, 133-135; J. Habermas, ‘Eine politische 
Verfassung für die pluralistische Weltgesellschaft?’, 38 Kritische Justiz (2005) 3, 222, 
228-232; Habermas, ‘Kommunikative Rationalität’, supra note 101; J. Habermas, 
‘Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts und die Legitimationsprobleme einer verfassten 
Weltgemeinschaft’, in Brugger, Neumann & Kirste (eds), supra note 71, 360, 368-373 
[Habermas, Konstitutionalisierung] 
152   According to the essential assets of the communicative paradigms, linguistic interaction 
can work only if the participants in the interaction assume that all those who are engaging 
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b) the claim for a non-egoistic approach avoids metaphysical assumptions insofar 
as the communicative capacity with which all humans are endowed has a merely 
transcendental – or better: linguistic-pragmatic – quality;153 c) solidarity does not 
depend on individual preferences or personal commitment, but is a normative 
duty, necessary in order to guarantee the basic conditions for human interaction 
at the most general level, which has to be translated into an adequate ethical and 
legal framework. 
F. Some Considerations on the Principles of an 
 Institutional Implementation of Inter-Peoples Solidarity
Summing up, the results of the inquiry can be synthesized into four main 
assertions: a) the establishment of solidarity as a legal principle – or even as a 
right determined by rules – is necessarily related to, and must be substantiated 
by, extra-legal arguments; b) the use of extra-legal arguments in order to interpret 
existing norms or, in general, further to develop the law is an admissible, and 
even unavoidable, procedure; c) the conceptions that deny the obligation to 
solidarity prove to be, on the whole, less theoretically well-founded than those 
that endorse it; and d) despite some conceptual problems and a general tendency 
to abstraction, we have enough convincing arguments – drawn in particular from 
the communicative paradigm – to claim that solidarity is a moral obligation that 
has to be properly transposed into legal form, and that one of the most important 
consequences of the obligation to solidarity consists in opening the forum to the 
others, specifically to those who have good reasons to claim solidarity.
This transposition has to involve both international and national public 
law, in forms that implicate equally the interpretation of the lex lata as well as the 
introduction of new norms. Starting with the ways to implement the obligation 
to solidarity within the framework of international law, future treaties should 
insert clearer references to solidarity between peoples, integrated with precise 
definitions of normative duties, as well as hitherto unusual obligations to open 
in the exchange of arguments a) are expressing true propositions (i.e. assertions that they 
consider to be provable), b) are being truthful (i.e. they are not cheating), and c) are 
eventually pursuing a just goal (i.e. they are not considering just their concerns). See: 
J.  Habermas, Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns 
(1984) 598.
153   Apel, Transformation, supra note 144, Vol. II, 358; Apel, Diskurs und Verantwortung, 
supra note 104.
255Opening the Forum to the Others
the internal fora to the presentation of arguments by non-national citizens.154 
Following such a possible and desirable evolution, solidarity would consolidate 
its present status as a principle by becoming at least a right defined by precisely 
formulated rules and capable of being claimed by individuals or groups.155 While 
the first kind of measures, namely the introduction into international treaties of 
clearer references to solidarity, may be seen as the improvement of a nonetheless 
already existing normative situation at the inter-state and supra-state level, the 
second – the opening of the internal fora – would probably be confronted, due 
to its complete lack of precedent and to its intervention in the political and 
legal mechanisms of the single states, with even greater resistance. Indeed, the 
international law norms providing for an obligation to open national fora up 
to non-national claims should be skilfully and cautiously conceived, imposing 
well-balanced procedures and avoiding any risk of jeopardizing the principle 
of autonomy. Nevertheless, if we take the obligation to solidarity seriously, 
then opening the internal fora must be seen as necessary insofar as the national 
decision-making-process must also internalize the multilevel setting of social 
interaction. Moreover, even if we maintain the centrality of sovereignty, there 
are good reasons for re-conceiving sovereign states, in a globalised world, as 
“[...] trustees of humanity [...]”.156 Therefore, arguments of non-nationals have 
to be taken into account – even within the framework of national legal systems 
– when these arguments refer to their role against the background of universal 
human interaction.157 Furthermore, international courts should be committed to 
the application of the solidarity principle wherever the existing law gives them 
this chance; the commitment of the courts is justified by the above-mentioned 
legitimacy of resorting to extra-legal arguments so as to interpret the law, in 
particular when the norms leave a wide discretion open to judicial exegesis.
154   Such an enhancement of the international law instruments, however, is not only a project 
for the future; rather, it is a development which is already under way. For a detailed 
analysis of the international law instruments that provide for an involvement on non-
citizens in decision-making-processes of sovereign States, see E. Benvenisti, ‘Sovereigns as 
Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders’, 107 The 
American Journal of International Law (2013) 2, 295, 312 ff.
155   Such an extension of the legal status of solidarity would nevertheless not do away with the 
need to interpret and further develop the rules concerning it by resorting – as is always 
the case within the legal discourse – to extra-legal arguments.
156   Benvenisti, supra note 154.
157   The principle of the protection of the fundamental rules of universal human interaction 
by national courts has already been applied, at least to some extent, by the doctrine of 
universal jurisdiction in international criminal law.
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Nevertheless, the improvement of the solidarity principle as a legal 
obligation at the level of international law cannot be seen as exhaustive for at 
least two reasons. First, the inadequate democratic legitimation of international 
organizations and adjudication158 justifies relevant concerns by democratic states 
as regards the establishment of international law norms explicitly providing for 
a supra-state implementation of the duty of solidarity, or for the opening up 
of internal democratic fora, insofar as these norms and proceedings could be 
used by autocracies for political manipulation. This problem can be properly 
addressed only by improving the democratic legitimacy of international political 
institutions and tribunals through both the spreading of democratic government 
at national level and the introduction of elements of what has been called 
“cosmopolitan democracy” into the institutional framework of international 
organization.159 Although highly desirable, these progressive developments are 
out of reach, in their full range, for citizens of the single democratic nations. 
Moreover – and this is the second reason why the consolidation of the solidarity 
principle as a legal obligation within the international law horizon cannot be 
seen as sufficient – the principle of solidarity must find an adequate expression 
within national law and adjudication, too, since the fundamental norms of the 
most general human interaction, as a general obligation, have to be protected at 
all levels and should be anchored, therefore, in the national corpora iuris. The 
first national institutions called upon to act are the democratic parliaments, 
which have the task of passing clearly formulated norms – as open as possible, 
and as restrictive as necessary – containing precise regulations on the conditions 
under which the right to present claims before national institutions is granted 
to non-national citizens. The institutions involved by such norms are, first, the 
representative chambers themselves insofar as they admit that foreigners are 
included, under strict circumstances and excluding the right to participate in 
the voting process, in the law-making-procedures when it can be proved – on 
the basis of a public and well-motivated scrutiny regulated by law – that the 
bill being discussed is likely to affect their interests. A similar right to be heard 
can be applied – also in these cases after careful scrutiny – also, second, to 
administrative proceedings and, third, to the judiciary.
158   On the democratic legitimacy of international courts see: A. von Bogdandy & I. Venzke 
(eds), International Judicial Lawmaking (2012); A. von Bogdandy & I. Venzke, In Whose 
Name? (2014).
159   D. Archibugi, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy 
(2008); Habermas, Kommunikative Rationalität, supra note 101; Habermas, 
‘Konstitutionalisierung’, supra note 151.
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Admittedly, the perspectives drawn here may be situated far beyond the 
horizon of the immediate future. Nonetheless, they are not a chimera: if we do 
not want to leave our children a world that looks like a state of nature, we have to 
emphasize our institutional and intellectual fantasy – and finally acknowledge 
that only the universal recognition of rights and interests to all human beings 
can guarantee that our rights and interests are safe.
